| dc.contributor |
Cisternas Leyton, Gonzalo Sebastian |
|
| dc.creator |
Figueroa, Nicolás |
|
| dc.creator |
Cisternas Leyton, Gonzalo Sebastian |
|
| dc.date |
2019-03-11T15:57:38Z |
|
| dc.date |
2019-03-11T15:57:38Z |
|
| dc.date |
2015-10 |
|
| dc.date |
2015-05 |
|
| dc.date |
2019-02-05T19:04:27Z |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2023-03-01T18:08:36Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2023-03-01T18:08:36Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
07416261 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/120859 |
|
| dc.identifier |
Cisternas, Gonzalo, and Nicolás Figueroa. “Sequential Procurement Auctions and Their Effect on Investment Decisions.” The RAND Journal of Economics 46, no. 4 (October 2015): 824–843. |
|
| dc.identifier |
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0641-4960 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/278910 |
|
| dc.description |
We characterize the optimal mechanism and investment level in an environment where (i) two projects of independent costs are purchased sequentially, (ii) the buyer can commit to a two-period mechanism, and (iii) the winner of the first project can invest in a cost-reducing technology between auctions. We show that, in an attempt to induce more competition in the first period, the optimal mechanism gives an advantage to the first-period winner in the second auction. As a result of this advantage, the first-period winner invests more than the socially efficient level. Optimal advantages, therefore, create two different channels for cost minimization in buyer-supplier relationships. |
|
| dc.format |
application/pdf |
|
| dc.publisher |
Wiley |
|
| dc.relation |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12112 |
|
| dc.relation |
The RAND Journal of Economics |
|
| dc.rights |
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike |
|
| dc.rights |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ |
|
| dc.source |
Other repository |
|
| dc.title |
Sequential procurement auctions and their effect on investment decisions |
|
| dc.type |
Article |
|
| dc.type |
http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle |
|