Sangam: A Confluence of Knowledge Streams

The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission

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dc.creator Spencer, Jack
dc.date 2021-10-12T18:57:29Z
dc.date 2021-10-12T18:57:29Z
dc.date 2021-03
dc.date 2021-03
dc.date 2021-10-09T03:17:29Z
dc.date.accessioned 2023-03-01T18:04:54Z
dc.date.available 2023-03-01T18:04:54Z
dc.identifier 1573-0883
dc.identifier 0031-8116
dc.identifier https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/132936
dc.identifier Spencer, J. The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission. Philos Stud 178, 3819–3842 (2021)
dc.identifier.uri http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/278673
dc.description This paper develops a form of moral actualism that can explain the procreative asymmetry. Along the way, it defends and explains the attractive asymmetry: the claim that although an impermissible option can be self-conditionally permissible, a permissible option cannot be self-conditionally impermissible.
dc.format application/pdf
dc.language en
dc.publisher Springer Netherlands
dc.relation https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01627-y
dc.relation Philosophical Studies
dc.rights Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
dc.rights http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.rights The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.
dc.source Springer Netherlands
dc.title The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission
dc.type Article
dc.type http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle


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