Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements : Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy

Bown, Chad P.; Crowley, Meredith A.

dc.creator	Bown, Chad P.
dc.creator	Crowley, Meredith A.
dc.date	2012-03-19T18:38:20Z
dc.date	2012-03-19T18:38:20Z
dc.date	2010-03-01
dc.date.accessioned	2023-02-17T21:02:09Z
dc.date.available	2023-02-17T21:02:09Z
dc.identifier	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100301085442
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3710
dc.identifier.uri	http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/244674
dc.description	This paper estimates a model of a government making trade policy adjustments under a self-enforcing trade agreement in the presence of economic shocks. The empirical model is motivated by the formal theories of cooperative trade agreements. The authors find evidence that United States' use of its antidumping policy during 1997-2006 is consistent with increases in time-varying "cooperative" tariffs, where the likelihood of antidumping is increasing in the size of unexpected import surges, decreasing in the volatility of imports, and decreasing in the elasticities of import demand and export supply. The analysis finds additional support for the theory that some US antidumping use is consistent with cooperative behavior through a second empirical examination of how trading partners responded to these new US tariffs. Even after controlling for factors such as the expected cost and benefit to filing a WTO dispute or engaging in antidumping retaliation, the analysis find that trading partners are less likely to challenge such "cooperative" US antidumping tariffs that were imposed under terms-of-trade pressure suggested by the theory.
dc.language	English
dc.relation	Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5223
dc.rights	CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rights	World Bank
dc.subject	ANTIDUMPING
dc.subject	ANTIDUMPING ACTION
dc.subject	ANTIDUMPING CASES
dc.subject	ANTIDUMPING DATABASE
dc.subject	ANTIDUMPING DECISIONS
dc.subject	ANTIDUMPING DUTIES
dc.subject	ANTIDUMPING DUTY
dc.subject	ANTIDUMPING POLICIES
dc.subject	ANTIDUMPING POLICY
dc.subject	BILATERAL IMPORTS
dc.subject	BILATERAL TRADE
dc.subject	BUSINESS CYCLE
dc.subject	COEFFICIENT ESTIMATE
dc.subject	COMMERCIAL POLICY
dc.subject	CONTROL VARIABLES
dc.subject	COUNTRY DUMMY
dc.subject	CURRENCY
dc.subject	DEMAND CURVE
dc.subject	DEMAND ELASTICITIES
dc.subject	DEMAND ELASTICITY
dc.subject	DEPENDENT VARIABLE
dc.subject	DEPENDENT VARIABLES
dc.subject	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
dc.subject	DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
dc.subject	DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES
dc.subject	DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS
dc.subject	DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES
dc.subject	DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
dc.subject	DUMMY VARIABLE
dc.subject	DUMMY VARIABLES
dc.subject	ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
dc.subject	ECONOMIC RESEARCH
dc.subject	ECONOMIC SHOCK
dc.subject	ECONOMIC SHOCKS
dc.subject	ECONOMIC THEORY
dc.subject	ELASTICITY OF EXPORT
dc.subject	EQUILIBRIUM
dc.subject	EXPECTED VALUE
dc.subject	EXPLANATORY VARIABLE
dc.subject	EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
dc.subject	EXPORT GOODS
dc.subject	EXPORT SUPPLY
dc.subject	EXPORTER
dc.subject	EXPORTERS
dc.subject	EXPORTS
dc.subject	EXTERNALITY
dc.subject	FOREIGN COUNTRIES
dc.subject	FOREIGN COUNTRY
dc.subject	FOREIGN CURRENCY
dc.subject	FOREIGN MARKET
dc.subject	FOREIGN SOURCES
dc.subject	FOREIGN TRADE
dc.subject	FOREIGN TRADE POLICY
dc.subject	GROWTH RATE
dc.subject	GROWTH RATES
dc.subject	IMPORT
dc.subject	IMPORT DEMAND
dc.subject	IMPORT GROWTH
dc.subject	IMPORT PROTECTION
dc.subject	IMPORT RESTRICTION
dc.subject	IMPORT RESTRICTIONS
dc.subject	IMPORT VOLUME
dc.subject	IMPORT VOLUMES
dc.subject	INCOME REDISTRIBUTION
dc.subject	INDICATOR VARIABLES
dc.subject	INTERNATIONAL TRADE
dc.subject	INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
dc.subject	INVENTORIES
dc.subject	INVENTORY
dc.subject	LOW TARIFFS
dc.subject	MARGINAL EFFECTS
dc.subject	MARKET ACCESS
dc.subject	MARKET ECONOMIES
dc.subject	MARKET POWER
dc.subject	MARKET SHARE
dc.subject	MARKET SHARES
dc.subject	MEMBER COUNTRIES
dc.subject	MEMBER COUNTRY
dc.subject	NASH EQUILIBRIUM
dc.subject	OPPORTUNITY COST
dc.subject	OPPORTUNITY COSTS
dc.subject	OPTIMAL TARIFF
dc.subject	OPTIMAL TARIFFS
dc.subject	POLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subject	POSITIVE EFFECTS
dc.subject	PREFERENTIAL TRADE
dc.subject	PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT
dc.subject	REAL APPRECIATION
dc.subject	REAL EXCHANGE RATE
dc.subject	REAL EXCHANGE RATES
dc.subject	RECIPROCITY
dc.subject	ROBUSTNESS CHECK
dc.subject	ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
dc.subject	STANDARD DEVIATION
dc.subject	TARIFF CHANGE
dc.subject	TARIFF CONCESSION
dc.subject	TARIFF FORMATION
dc.subject	TARIFF INCREASE
dc.subject	TARIFF INCREASES
dc.subject	TARIFF LINE
dc.subject	TARIFF ON IMPORTS
dc.subject	TARIFF POLICY
dc.subject	TARIFF REDUCTION
dc.subject	TERMS OF TRADE
dc.subject	TERMS OF TRADE GAIN
dc.subject	TERMS-OF-TRADE EFFECT
dc.subject	TERMS-OF-TRADE GAINS
dc.subject	TOTAL EXPORTS
dc.subject	TRADE AGREEMENT
dc.subject	TRADE AGREEMENTS
dc.subject	TRADE BARRIERS
dc.subject	TRADE DEFLECTION
dc.subject	TRADE DISPUTES
dc.subject	TRADE EFFECT
dc.subject	TRADE FLOWS
dc.subject	TRADE GROWTH
dc.subject	TRADE MOTIVES
dc.subject	TRADE PARTNER
dc.subject	TRADE POLICIES
dc.subject	TRADE POLICY
dc.subject	TRADE PROTECTION
dc.subject	TRADE REMEDIES
dc.subject	TRADE VOLUME
dc.subject	TRADE VOLUMES
dc.subject	TRADING PARTNER
dc.subject	TRADING PARTNERS
dc.subject	VALUE OF IMPORTS
dc.subject	WORLD TRADE
dc.subject	WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
dc.subject	WTO
dc.title	Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements : Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy
dc.type	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
dc.coverage	The World Region
dc.coverage	The World Region